Protocol overruns are proposed for the Diffie-Hellman Authentication Group (GDH). Here is a more general description of the protocol: A method of authentication between parties who communicate with each other is generally necessary to prevent this type of attack. Variants of Diffie-Hellman, z.B. THE STS protocol, can be used to avoid these types of attacks. The Diffie Hellman key exchange has been one of the most important developments in cryptography with public keys and is still often implemented in a series of security protocols today. Authentication with anonymity protection is a popular topic and there are some popular techniques for achieving customer anonymity during the authentication process. Dog  categorizes existing techniques into four categories: probabilistic encryption schemes such as the OAKley protocol , pseudonym schemes such as , hash chain-based diagrams, such as Ohkubo et al.s  and error correction schemes such as [2, 3]. It is difficult to extend to their anonymous versions key CDHP-based chord schemes such as [5-7, 13] (or ECDHP-based diagrams such as ) and reduce the modular exposure load (or the burden of multiplying points). In this article, we first formulate a modified ECDHP (MDHP) and prove its safety. Next, we propose a new bipartisan key agreement scheme authenticated with client anonymity, based on the problem of MECDHP and Ohkubo et al.s Hashing chain technique .
The new scheme protects customer anonymity, effectively reduces the customer`s computational load and preserves the high security of the ECDHP. Although the Diffie-Hellman key agreement is itself a key, unauthtified protocol, it forms the basis of a multitude of authenticated protocols and is used to provide secrecy in volatile Transport Layer Security modes (called EDH or DHE depending on the encryption suite). The G order should have a big primary factor to prevent the use of the De Pohlig Hellman algorithm to get a b or a b. For this reason, a Sophie Germain premium q is sometimes used to calculate p -2q-1, which is called a safe prime number, because the G order is then divisible only by 2 and q. g is then sometimes chosen to generate the Q subgroup of G instead of G, so that the ga Legendre symbol never indicates the lower-order bit. A protocol that uses such a choice is z.B. IKEv2.  Usually, the problem of diffie-hellman on the Galis field (CDHP) and the same problem on elliptical curves (eCDHP) are, because of their hardness, the most popular elements for many authenticated key chord schemes [4-8, 10-19]. However, modular exposure calculations on the Galis field or the multiplication of points on elliptical curves represent a significant computational load for customers, for whom either their computing capacity or their batteries are limited. These customers are called light customers in the rest of this document. Even a key Native D-H diagram (without authentication of the communicating parts) that uses the cdHP requires two modular exposures from each part, and the corresponding version on the elliptical curves would require two point multiplications of each part. In general, an authenticated version of the key D-H diagram or an advanced version of the key D-H diagram that protects customer anonymity would require more modular exposures or more point multiplications [9-12, 14-16, 20].